Superyacht shipyard accounts reveal thin margins, volatile cash flow and heavy reliance on deposits, order books and strong owners despite record demand.
A superyacht may cost tens or even hundreds of millions of euros, but that does not necessarily make building one an exceptionally profitable business.
Superyacht Guide has reviewed the available accounts, financial announcements and corporate filings of shipyards across Europe. The evidence shows an industry with strong demand and long order books, but also thin margins, volatile annual results, large working-capital requirements and heavy reliance on customer deposits and financially committed owners.
The financial position of individual yards varies enormously. Some listed groups are producing double-digit profit margins and substantial cash reserves. Other respected builders generate hundreds of millions in annual revenue while retaining only a small profit—or sometimes recording a loss.
High yacht prices do not guarantee high shipyard profits
The price paid for a completed yacht must cover far more than the builder’s profit.
Construction costs include steel or aluminium, engines, generators, electrical systems, interiors, specialist subcontractors, design and engineering, classification, painting, commissioning, warranties and several years of skilled labour.
The shipyard may administer an enormous contract while retaining only a relatively small percentage as operating profit.
Ferretti Group provides one of the strongest current examples of a profitable yacht-building business. It reported €1.232 billion in net revenue from new yachts during 2025, adjusted EBITDA of €202.8 million and net profit of €90.1 million. Its adjusted EBITDA margin was 16.5%, and it ended the year with €111 million in net cash.
Sanlorenzo reported an even higher EBITDA margin. Its 2025 new-yacht revenue was €960.4 million, EBITDA was €180.6 million and group net profit reached €107.4 million. The resulting EBITDA margin was 18.8%, while its net-profit margin exceeded 11%.
These are unusually strong results for the sector. Both businesses benefit from established brands, repeatable yacht platforms, multiple product ranges, international sales networks and the ability to spread development and purchasing costs across numerous vessels.
The economics can look very different at a lower-volume custom yard.
Heesen disclosed record 2024 revenue of €209 million and EBITDA of €17 million, equivalent to a margin of about 8.1%. This was a positive operating result, but well below the margins reported by Ferretti and Sanlorenzo.
EBITDA margins differ substantially between shipyards. Reporting periods differ: Sanlorenzo and Ferretti Group FY2025; Heesen Yachts FY2024.
Revenue can be highly misleading
Shipyard revenue often changes dramatically from one year to the next because large vessels take several years to complete.
The accounting result depends on how the yard recognises construction milestones, changes in work in progress, owner payments, contract variations, delivery, acceptance and expected completion costs.
Abeking & Rasmussen illustrates the effect. Its consolidated revenue increased from €15.6 million in 2022 to €419.7 million in 2023. That did not represent ordinary growth of more than 2,000%. It largely reflected movements in unfinished projects and the timing of revenue recognition.
Despite the €419.7 million revenue figure, the group reported net profit of only €2.81 million—a margin of approximately 0.7%.
Its balance sheet was considerably stronger than the margin alone might suggest. At the end of 2023, Abeking & Rasmussen held almost €49 million in cash, approximately €65.5 million in equity and only €2 million in bank debt.
This demonstrates why revenue, profit, cash and debt must be considered together. A low-margin yard may still possess a strong balance sheet, while a rapidly growing builder may be heavily dependent on external funding.
High revenue does not necessarily produce a high bottom-line return. Percentages are directly comparable even though the companies report in different currencies.
Order books show demand—not profit
Long order books are widely used as evidence of strength in the superyacht industry. They provide production visibility, support employment and help shipyards plan facilities and supplier requirements.
They do not prove that the contracts will be profitable.
Sanlorenzo ended 2025 with a gross order backlog of €1.96 billion. It reported that 88% of those orders were already secured by final clients, with net backlog exceeding €1 billion.
Ferretti’s 2025 results also showed substantial future workload, while the company reported that its growth was increasingly supported by made-to-measure and larger yacht segments.
However, every contract carries assumptions about labour, materials, subcontracting, inflation, engineering and completion dates. If those assumptions prove wrong, an apparently impressive order book can contain projects that generate very little profit—or a loss.
A badly priced €100 million contract can be more dangerous than an empty construction slot.
Order books provide future production visibility, but they do not guarantee that the underlying contracts will be profitable.
Customer deposits finance much of the construction process
Superyachts are normally paid for in instalments linked to contractual milestones.
These payments help finance construction, but they are not the same as earned profit. The money remains economically connected to the obligation to complete and deliver the vessel.
The Abeking & Rasmussen accounts demonstrate the scale involved. At the end of 2023, the group recorded €216.4 million of unfinished and unbilled work, €162.7 million of advance payments made and approximately €396.1 million of customer advances, including amounts offset against work in progress.
This creates an important distinction when analysing shipyard cash.
A yard may hold a substantial cash balance, but much of that money may already be required for machinery and equipment, materials not yet delivered, subcontractors, interiors, final outfitting, sea trials, warranties and completion obligations.
Cash should therefore be assessed alongside customer advances, remaining construction costs and work in progress.
Repeatable platforms generally produce stronger economics
The strongest financial performers tend to combine standardised engineering with extensive owner customisation.
A repeatable platform allows a builder to reuse naval architecture, structural engineering, technical layouts, tooling, supplier agreements, tested components and production procedures.
The owner can still select interiors, styling, layouts and equipment, but the underlying yacht does not have to be engineered entirely from the beginning.
This helps explain why groups with established series and semi-custom ranges can produce more consistent margins than low-volume yards building only one-off vessels.
Ferretti’s 2025 revenue increased strongly in its made-to-measure and superyacht segments even as revenue from smaller composite yachts declined. Its superyacht revenue rose to €190.3 million, while made-to-measure yacht revenue reached €494.6 million.
Sanlorenzo’s Superyacht Division generated €281.5 million during 2025, alongside its Yacht, Bluegame and Nautor Swan divisions.
The ability to operate across several ranges also reduces dependence on a single vessel or market segment.
Full-custom construction carries greater risk
A fully custom yacht can command a very high price, but it also exposes the shipyard to greater uncertainty.
Each project may require new structural solutions, technical systems, production methods and specialist suppliers. Owner changes during construction can add further complexity.
The risks include engineering overruns, material-price inflation, late design changes, supplier failure, delayed owner decisions, commissioning problems, warranty claims and fixed-price contracts that do not fully recover increased costs.
A yard delivering only one or two yachts per year can have its entire annual result determined by the performance of a single contract.
This does not make custom construction a poor business model. It means contract pricing, project controls, change-order management and financial reserves are especially important.
Expansion can increase revenue while reducing profit
Many shipyards are currently investing in new halls, production sites, equipment and larger-yacht capacity.
Expansion normally increases costs before the full financial benefit appears. The yard must recruit and train staff, purchase machinery, fund construction work and absorb higher fixed overheads.
Ferretti invested approximately €89.2 million in tangible and intangible assets during 2025, including operational maintenance, product development and business expansion.
Sanlorenzo reported €48.2 million of organic net capital expenditure, with most of the investment directed towards additional industrial capacity, distribution and new-product development.
Larger groups can usually fund such programmes through accumulated cash, bank facilities or capital markets. Smaller private yards may depend more heavily on customer instalments, shareholder loans or wealthy owners.
Rapid growth should therefore be considered both a sign of confidence and a source of financial risk.
Ownership can be as important as profitability
Many leading shipyards are controlled by families, industrial groups, investment funds or wealthy private owners.
Strong ownership can provide working capital, guarantees to banks and clients, funds for speculative construction, support during delivery delays, investment in facilities and the ability to survive a temporary loss.
However, shareholder support is not the same as operational profitability. A yard can remain active and continue launching yachts while requiring repeated injections of capital.
The crucial question is not simply whether a wealthy owner exists, but whether the underlying yard is gradually becoming self-sustaining.
Financial transparency remains uneven
Listed companies such as Ferretti and Sanlorenzo publish detailed accounts, segment results, order books, cash positions and investment figures.
Private yards often disclose far less. Available information may consist only of turnover, a management statement, an export figure, an abbreviated balance sheet, a sustainability report or accounts for one subsidiary rather than the whole group.
Different companies also use different top-line measures, including revenue, turnover, net revenue, production value, economic value generated and exports.
These figures are not automatically comparable.
A brand may also be part of a larger group whose accounts include commercial ships, naval work, equipment manufacturing or other activities. The legal entity, reporting scope, currency and accounting definition must always accompany the number.
What the accounts ultimately reveal
The available evidence points to an industry with strong demand but widely varying financial quality.
The healthiest shipyards generally combine repeatable technical platforms, disciplined project pricing, substantial customer deposits, strong cash and equity, controlled debt, multiple active projects, after-sales and refit income, and committed long-term ownership.
The main warning signs are revenue rising while margins fall, persistent operating losses, negative equity, heavy finance costs, weak operating cash flow, repeated ownership changes, speculative yachts without buyers, overdue accounts and large order books accompanied by poor profitability.
The central lesson is straightforward: the retail value of a superyacht should never be confused with the financial strength of the shipyard that builds it.
A full order book proves that owners want yachts. Only the accounts reveal whether the builder is making money from them.
Sources
- Ferretti Group 2025 annual financial report
- Sanlorenzo annual financial report for 2025
- Heesen 2024 financial and ownership announcement
- Abeking & Rasmussen 2023 consolidated accounts
Financial figures are reported in their original currencies and according to the definitions used by each company. Revenue, turnover, production value and economic value are not always directly comparable.