Gard Finds Half of 65 Fishing-Vessel Collisions in China

Gard has published new collision-loss data showing that half of 65 claims involving fishing vessels occurred in Chinese waters. The insurer says the risk is particularly acute around the staged lifting of seasonal fishing bans, when large numbers of fishing boats return to sea and traffic density can increase sharply in coastal routes.

The claims are not a superyacht-only dataset and should not be presented as one. They arise from Gard’s wider marine portfolio, but the bridge-management lessons are directly relevant to large yachts operating in busy fishing areas because the underlying issues involve lookout, safe speed, passage planning, radar and AIS use, and timely avoiding action.

Seasonal fishing activity changes the risk picture

Gard highlights the annual Chinese fishing ban that begins on 1 May across large areas of the Bohai Sea, Yellow Sea, East China Sea and the South China Sea north of 12 degrees north. The ban is lifted in stages, including 16 August, 1 September and 16 September depending on sea area and latitude, creating periods when fishing traffic can return quickly.

For a yacht bridge team, that means route planning should consider not only charts and traffic-separation systems but also seasonal activity that may alter the number and behaviour of small vessels encountered. A passage that appears routine at one time of year may require more bridge personnel, lower speed and wider margins when fishing grounds are heavily occupied.

High speed and weak lookout recur in claims

Gard identifies recurring factors including high speed through fishing grounds, inadequate bridge watchkeeping, delayed avoiding action and communication difficulties. The insurer also warns that small wooden or fibreglass fishing vessels, gear and low-profile targets can be difficult to detect reliably, particularly when weather, clutter, target aspect or poor radar setup reduces detection quality.

Those factors matter to superyachts because speed can compress decision time dramatically in dense traffic. A yacht capable of fast cruising may have excellent sensors, but the value of those systems depends on watchkeepers using them alongside an effective visual lookout and being willing to reduce speed early when the traffic picture becomes uncertain.

AIS and radar are aids, not complete answers

Gard specifically warns against over-reliance on AIS and radar information. Fishing vessels may have AIS switched off, transmit inaccurate data or be poorly detected by radar, while large numbers of AIS targets can also create clutter on radar and ECDIS displays rather than simplifying the bridge team’s task.

The practical lesson is to combine all available means instead of treating one electronic source as conclusive. Visual lookout, radar and ARPA, AIS, ECDIS, VHF, light and sound signals, and early manoeuvring all contribute to the collision-avoidance picture, with each method having limitations that the others may help offset.

What yacht captains can take from the claims

Gard recommends stronger voyage planning, additional bridge watchkeeping when necessary, safe speed with engines ready for manoeuvring, and early course changes to keep clear of clusters of fishing boats. It also stresses that when a collision is suspected, the vessel should render assistance, contact the relevant authorities and preserve evidence such as voyage-data records.

For yacht operations, the most useful takeaway is that dense fishing traffic deserves deliberate preparation rather than last-minute reaction. The claims show how ordinary navigation can become high-consequence very quickly when speed, incomplete information and late decisions combine in confined or heavily used waters.