KONGSBERG Tests Positioning Systems Under Real GNSS Jamming

KONGSBERG has tested its latest positioning-reference technology during Jammertest 2026 on Andøya, Norway, where GNSS signals were deliberately jammed and spoofed under controlled real-world conditions. The programme gave engineers a rare opportunity to observe how dynamic-positioning reference systems behave when satellite navigation becomes degraded, unavailable or actively manipulated.

Controlled interference creates a realistic test environment

Jammertest brings technology providers into an environment where satellite-navigation interference can be generated deliberately and monitored safely. KONGSBERG used the 2026 programme to expose positioning equipment to the kinds of signal disruption that vessels can encounter near conflict zones, busy ports or areas affected by intentional and accidental radio-frequency interference.

Testing under controlled interference provides more useful engineering evidence than relying only on laboratory simulations. Engineers can see how complete systems react as signal quality deteriorates, how quickly warnings appear and whether alternative sensors or protection techniques maintain a usable position reference.

Several positioning configurations were tested

KONGSBERG says its test vehicle carried multiple dynamic-positioning reference configurations using different GNSS receivers and controlled-reception-pattern antenna technology, including the company’s JRAS solution. Comparing configurations under the same interference makes it possible to identify where resilience comes from and where further development is required.

For yachts using sophisticated bridge and station-keeping systems, the issue is increasingly relevant because GNSS information is shared across navigation, communications and automation networks. A failure or manipulated position input can therefore affect more than one display or function if system architecture is not designed around degraded operation.

Spoofing is different from simple signal loss

Jamming normally prevents a receiver from obtaining a reliable satellite signal, while spoofing attempts to make the receiver accept false positioning information. The second problem can be especially challenging because a system may appear to be working while the reported position is being displaced from reality.

Resilient navigation therefore depends on detection as well as reception strength. Cross-checking independent sensors, monitoring signal behaviour and rejecting suspicious inputs can help bridge teams recognise when satellite information should no longer be trusted as the primary reference.

Test data feeds the next generation of resilient systems

KONGSBERG says the data gathered at Andøya will support continuing development of positioning and dynamic-positioning reference products. Real interference data can help engineers tune detection thresholds, validate antenna performance and improve the way systems communicate degraded status to operators.

For the superyacht sector, the practical lesson is that satellite navigation can no longer be treated as an infallible background service. Owners, captains and technical managers increasingly need bridge systems that remain understandable and controllable when the external positioning environment becomes unreliable.

Official sources: www.kongsberg.com.